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Abstract
Unsolicited e-mail (spam) is a severe problem due to intrusion of privacy,
online fraud, viruses and time spent reading unwanted messages. To solve
this issue, Collaborative Filtering (CF) and Content-Based Filtering (CBF)
solutions have been adopted. We propose a new CBF-CF hybrid approach
called Symbiotic Data Mining (SDM), which aims at aggregating distinct
local ﬁlters in order to improve ﬁltering at a personalized level using
collaboration while preserving privacy. We apply SDM to spam e-mail
detection and compare it with a local CBF ﬁlter (i.e. Naive Bayes). Several
experiments were conducted by using a novel corpus based on the well
known Enron datasets mixed with recent spam. The results show that the
symbiotic strategy is competitive in performance when compared to CBF
and also more robust to contamination attacks.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, it is easy to collect, process and share data.
The ﬁeld of Data Mining (DM) deals with the extraction
of knowledge (e.g. patterns) from raw data and it has
been successfully used in distinct domains (e.g. marketing,
medicine or Internet) [1]. Moreover, the Internet growth
opened room for important communication and information
sharing services (e.g. Web, e-mail). However, this expansion
also led to severe problems, such as information overload
and unsolicited e-mail (known as spam).
The cost of sending spam is tiny and it is easy to reach a
high number of potential consumers [2]. Spam emerged very
quickly after e-mail itself and currently over 120 billion of
these messages are sent each day [3]. While e-mail is the
most known form of spam, this phenomenon also affects
other services, such as instant messaging (spim). Spam is an
intrusion of privacy and many messages are of adult content,
online fraud or viruses. Moreover, spam has costs in terms
of trafﬁc fees and time spent reading unwanted messages.
Currently, there are two major approaches to ﬁght spam
[4]: Collaborative Filtering (CF) and Content-Based Fil-
tering (CBF). CF is based on sharing information about
spam messages, while CBF uses a DM classiﬁer (e.g.
Naive Bayes) that learns to discriminate spam from message
features (e.g. common spam words). CF can be based on
blacklists [5], which contain IP addresses of known spam
senders, or ﬁngerprints extracted from spam messages [6].
Current research on spam CBF relies mainly on improving
individual classiﬁer performance, by a better preprocessing
[4] or enhancement of the learning algorithm [7]. Ensem-
bles that combine distinct spam classiﬁers have also been
proposed [8].
Both CF and CBF have drawbacks. CF often suffers
from sparsity of data (e.g. users may classify few messages)
and ﬁrst-rater problem (e.g. an e-mail cannot be classiﬁed
unless a user has rated it before). Moreover, people have
personal views of what is spam and CF often discards
this issue [9]. On the other hand, in CBF there may be
a large gap between low-level features (e.g. bit color) and
high-level concepts (e.g. spam images). Furthermore, poor
performances may be achieved by new users, since CBF
requires several representative training examples. CBF is
also vulnerable to dictionary or focused attacks, where the
adversary can exploit DM models by contaminating the
training set (e.g. by sending spam with a large amount of
normal words) [10]. By fusing these two views there is a
potential for a better personalized ﬁltering. However, the
number of studies that unify CBF and CF is scarce and
mainly addressed towards recommendation systems that run
at centralized systems [11].
We propose a novel Distributed DM (DDM) approach,
based on a hybrid CBF-CF view and named Symbiotic
Data Mining (SDM). The idea is to join distinct entities
(e.g. e-mail users) interested on similar DM goals (e.g.
spam ﬁltering). Rather than exchanging data (e.g. messages),
these entities will share information about what each local
ﬁlter has learned (e.g. DM models). The aim of SDM is
to foster mutual relationships, where all or most members
beneﬁt. Under SDM, each user is interested in improving
ﬁltering at a personal level. The Internet is used to gather
collaborators among these (high number of) users. Users
may dynamically join or leave this collaboration and there
are privacy issues regarding what can be shared. The classic
DDM approach [12] is targeted to obtain a scalable global
DM model for a single entity by aggregating several local
DM analyses. SDM is different from pure DDM and the
centralized CBF-CF works (e.g. [11]) since SDM data and
models are distributed through distinct entities. Hence, there
are issues of user management (e.g. adding or removing a
user), privacy, security and motivation (e.g. each user should
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beneﬁt from the collaboration).
In this paper, we apply SDM to spam detection and
compare it with a local CBF ﬁlter (i.e. Naive Bayes). The
remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents the e-mail data, local and symbiotic ﬁltering meth-
ods, and evaluation metrics. Next, the results are presented
and discussed (Section 3). Finally, closing conclusions are
drawn (Section 4).
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Spam data
Several public benchmark datasets to evaluate anti-spam
ﬁlters have been proposed [13], such as : the Ling-spam1,
SpamAssassin2, Spambase3 and TREC 2005 Spam Track4.
The ﬁrst dataset mixed spam with legitimate messages (ham)
collected from public archives (e.g. newsgroups), the second
uses public fora or donations by users, the third includes only
preprocessed features (e.g. word frequencies) and the fourth
employed several ﬁlters to discard spam of the Enron e-mail
[14] collection. As pointed by [13], none of these datasets
is ﬁtted for personalized ﬁltering. Ham messages from
Ling-spam are more topic-speciﬁc than what normal users
tend to receive. In contrast, SpamAssassin ham messages
are less-speciﬁc, since users tend to donate general (non-
sensitive) messages. Spambase does not contain raw data
(e.g. message date). Finally, the Spam Track was used for a
global evaluation of ﬁlters, merging all user messages into
a single corpus.
To evaluate SDM, ideally there should be real spam/ham
messages collected from distinct users (possibly from a
social network) during a given time period. Yet, due to
logistic and privacy issues, it is quite difﬁcult to obtain such
data and make it public. Hence, we will use a synthetic
mixture of real spam and ham messages, in a strategy
similar to what has been proposed in [6], [13]. The ham
messages will be related to ﬁve Enron employees with the
largest mailboxes collected during the same time period. In
particular, we will use the cleaned-up form provided by
[14] of the mailboxes: kaminski-v (kam), farmer-d (far),
beck-s (bec), lokay-m (lok) and kitchen-l (kit). Since these
employees worked at the same organization, it is reasonable
to assume that they would know each other, i.e. belong to
a social network. We will also use the spam collection of
Bruce Guenter5, which is based in spam traps (i.e. fake
emails published in the Web), during the years of 2006
and 2007 (our dataset was built in 2008). Only messages
with Latin character sets were selected, because the ham
1. http://www.iit.demokritos.gr/skel/i-conﬁg/downloads/
2. http://spamassassin.apache.org/publiccorpus/
3. http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Spambase
4. http://plg.uwaterloo.ca/˜gvcormac/treccorpus/
5. http://untroubled.org/spam/
messages use this type of character coding and non-Latin
mails would be easy to detect. Also, since this collection
contains several copies of the same messages (due to the
use of multiple traps), we removed duplicates by comparing
MD5 signatures of the body messages.
We propose a mixture algorithm that is based on the
time that each message was received (date ﬁeld, using the
GMT time zone), which we believe is more realistic than the
sampling procedure adopted in [13]. Since the Enron data is
from a previous period (see Table 1), we ﬁrst added 6 years
to the date ﬁeld of all ham messages. Let St denote a spam
message received at time t, Si,f = (Sti , Sti+1 , . . . , Stf ) the
time ordered sequence of the Bruce Guenter spam, Hu,i,f
and Su,i,f the sequences of ham and spam messages for user
u from time ti to tf . For a given time period t ∈ (ti, . . . , tf ),
the algorithm randomly selects |S′i,j | spam messages from
Si,j . Then, Su,i,j is set by sampling messages from S′i,j with
a probability of P for each message selection. The size of
S′i,j (cardinality) is given by:
|S′i,j | =
R·
∑L
i=1
|Hu,i,j |
P ·L
(1)
where L denotes the total number of users available at the
time period and R is the overall (i.e. including all user
and time data) spam/ham ratio. Since the time periods are
different for each user (Table 1), four time sequences (i.e.
ti and tj values) were used by the algorithm (Figure 1).
Table 1. Summary of the S-Enron corpus
user ham spam time spam
size size period /ham
kam 4363 2827 [12/05,05/07] 0.6
far 3294 2844 [12/05,05/07] 0.9
bec 1965 2763 [01/06,05/07] 1.4
lok 1455 2202 [06/06,05/07] 1.5
kit 789 623 [02/07,05/07] 0.8
Date (Year)
2006 2007
kam
far
bec
lok
kit
L=2 L=3 L=4 L=5
I
II
III
Figure 1. Temporal view of the S-Enron mailboxes.
The mixture is affected by the R and P parameters. Since
a high number of experiments is addressed in this work,
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we will ﬁx these parameters to reasonable values. While
the global spam/ham ratio is R = 1, the individual ratios
range from 0.6 to 1.5. Also, the spam/ham ratios ﬂuctuate
through time (as shown in Figure 3). On the other hand,
the probability of spam selection affects the percentage of
common spam between users. If two users have similar
proﬁles (e.g. e-mail exposure), then they should receive
similar spam. We assume that this scenario is expected
for the Enron employees and thus set P = 0.5. Under
this setup and for a given time period, any 2 users will
receive around 50% of similar spam, 3 users will share
around 25% of spam and so on. The resulting corpus is
named S-Enron and it is public available in its raw form at:
http://www3.dsi.uminho.pt/pcortez/S-Enron.
2.2. Local ﬁlter
We will address only textual content (i.e. word fre-
quencies) of e-mail messages. This popular approach (e.g.
Thunderbird ﬁlter) has the advantage of being generalizable
to wider contexts (e.g. spim detection). While different
algorithms can be adopted for spam ﬁltering, such as Support
Vector Machines (SVM) [2], we will use the simpler Naive
Bayes (NB), which is widely adopted by anti-spam ﬁltering
tools [4], [15]. As both individual and symbiotic strategies
will be compared using the same learning algorithm, we
believe that most of the results presented in this paper can
be extended to other text classiﬁers. We will also adopt the
preprocessing proposed in [16]:
1) The word frequencies are extracted from the subject
and body message (with the HTML tags previously
removed). Each message j is encoded into a vector
xj = (x1j , . . . , xmj), where xij is the number of
occurrences of token Xi in the text.
2) The feature selection is applied, which consists in
ignoring any words when xij < 5 in the training set
and then selecting up to the 3000 most relevant fea-
tures according to the Mutual Information (MI(Xi))
criterion:
MI(Xi) =
∑
c∈{s,¬s}
p(Xi|c)log p(Xi|c)
p(Xi)p(c)
(2)
where c is the message class (s - spam or ¬s - ham),
p(Xi|c) is the probability of ﬁnding token Xi in e-
mails from class c, p(Xi) and p(c) are the proportions
of Xi terms and c class examples present in the data.
3) Each xij value is transformed into: x′ij = log(xij +1)
(TF transform), x′′ij = x
′
ij · log(k/
∑
k δik) (IDF
transform) and x′′′ij = x
′′
ij/
√∑
l(xlj)2 (length nor-
malization), where δik is 1 if the token i exists in the
message k and 0 otherwise.
The NB computes the probability that a document j is
spam (s) for a ﬁlter trained over Du email data from user
u, according to:
p(s|xj ,Du) = α · p(s|Du)
m∏
i
p(Xi|s,Du) (3)
where α is normalization constant that ensures that
p(s|x,Du)+p(¬s|x,Du) = 1, p(s|Du) is the p(s) of dataset
Du. The p(Xi|s,Du) estimation depends on the NB version.
In this work, we will use the multi-variate Gauss NB (as
implemented in the R tool, see Section 3) [13]:
p(Xi|c,Du) = 1
σi,c
√
2π
e
−
(x′′′
ij
−μi,c)2
2σ2
i,c (4)
where μi,s and σi,s are the mean and standard deviation
estimated from the c = s or c = ¬s messages of Du.
In [10], it has been shown that local spam ﬁlters are
vulnerable to dictionary and focused contamination attacks.
The former attack is used to reduce the CBF efﬁciency,
leading the victim to read spam, while the latter can be
used to prevent the victim from reading an important email.
Both attacks can be achieved by sending spam messages
mixed with normal words. Once the victim labels these
messages as spam, the training set is contaminated and
the ﬁlter will be affected the next time it is retrained. A
dictionary aggression consists in sending a large amount of
normal words, while the focused assault assumes that the
attacker has some knowledge of a speciﬁc message that the
victim will receive in the future (e.g. a competing offer for
a given contract).
2.3. Symbiotic ﬁlter
While sharing models is less sensitive than exchanging
e-mail messages, there are still privacy issues. For instance,
if user A has access to the ﬁlter of user B, then A may
feed a given token (or set of tokens) into the model and
thus know some probability that such token was classiﬁed
by B as spam or ham. To solve this problem, we propose an
anonymous distribution of the ﬁlters, under two possibilities:
using a trustable application or a secure server. The former
can be used in a Peer-2-Peer (P2P) setting, where the users
trust the software to blindly share ﬁlters among all members,
while the latter works under a centralized model where the
anonymization is achieved by an intermediate secure server.
Figure 2 shows example of both scenarios, where user C
receives the local ﬁlters from users A and B without knowing
who built each model. Since in SDM there will be typically
a large number of users that dynamically may join or leave
the collaboration, it will be very difﬁcult to “guess” who
created each model. The degree of privacy can be increased
further if each user does not know who belongs to the
symbiotic group. Regarding the ﬁlter sharing, a standard
format should be adopted, such as the Predictive Model
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anonymous
filter filter
anonymous
filter A filter B
anonymousanonymous
filter filter
user A
user C
user B
user C
user Buser A secureserver
Figure 2. Blind exchange of ﬁlters by using a trustable
application (left) or secure server (right).
Markup Language [17], which is compatible with a large
number of DM products.
In SDM, the individual predictions can be combined by
using a collaborative ensemble of the local ﬁlters. While
several combination functions can be adopted (e.g. average),
we propose a hierarchical learning, where the outputs of
the local DM models are used as the inputs of another
(meta-level) learner. Hence, each SDM user would have a
local meta-learner that is dynamically trained to get a high
accuracy on its past personal data. When compared with
the equal weights (average) function, the meta-learner is
more ﬁtted for SDM, since it can dynamically (i.e. through
time) assign different weights to distinct users (see Figure 5).
While several algorithms could be used for the hierarchical
learning (e.g. SVM), we will adopt the same NB described in
the previous section. The rationale is that NB is commonly
adopted by anti-spam solutions, thus incorporating SDM into
these tools would be simpler by reuse of code.
We assume that each user u trains a local ﬁlter θu,t
over her/his Du training data. Filters can be trained asyn-
chronously and L ﬁlters will be available for each user at
time t: {θ1,t, . . . , θL,t}. The Symbiotic NB (SNB) meta-
model spam probability is given by:
p(s|xj ,D′u) = α · p(s|D′u)
∏L
i=1 p(θi,t|s,D′u)
p(θi,t|c,D′u) = 1σi,c√2π e
− (p(s|xj ,θi,t,D
′
u)−μi,c)2
2σ2
i,c
(5)
where D′u is the SNB training set and p(s|xj , θi,t,D′u) is the
probability given by the ﬁlter θi,t, as computed in Equation
3. To reduce memory and computational requirements, we
allow that D′u ⊆ Du, where M = |D′u| denotes the most
recent messages from u mailbox. It should be noted that
any token from xj that is not considered by θi,t will simply
be discarded by the ﬁlter from user i. Similarly, any input
attribute from θi,t that is not included in xj will be set to 0.
2.4. Evaluation
Since spam detection evolves through time (i.e. there is a
concept drift), we will adopt the more realistic incremental
retraining evaluation procedure, where a mailbox is split into
batches b1, . . . , bn of K adjacent messages (|bn| may be less
than K) [13]. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, the ﬁlter is trained
with Du = b1 ∪ . . .∪ bi and tested the messages from bi+1.
Figure 3 shows an example the evolution of the kam mailbox
spam/ham ratio over different batches, with K = 100 and
during the time period III of Figure 1.
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Figure 3. Evolution of the spam/ham ratio for the kam
mailbox.
For a given probabilistic ﬁlter, the predicted class is given
by s if p(s|xj ,Du) > D, where D ∈ [0.0, 1.0] is a decision
threshold. For a given D and test set, it is possible to
compute the true (TPR) and false (FPR) positive rates:
TPR = TP/(TP + FN)
FPR = FP/(TN + FP ) (6)
where TP , FP , TN and FN denote the number of true
positives, false positives, true negatives and false negatives,
respectively. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve shows the performance of a two class classiﬁer across
the range of possible threshold (D) values, plotting FPR
(x-axis) versus TPR (y-axis) [18]. The global accuracy is
given by the area under the curve (AUC =
∫ 1
0
ROCdD). A
random classiﬁer will have an AUC of 0.5, while the ideal
value should be close to 1.0. Since the cost of losing normal
e-mail (FP ) is much higher than receiving spam (FN ), D
is usually set to favor points in the low false-positive region
of the ROC. Thus, we will also adopt the metric TPR at
a speciﬁc FPR = r (denoted as TPR@FPR=r), where r is
close to 0.0 [7]. With the incremental retraining procedure,
one ROC will be computed for each bi+1 batch and the
overall results will be presented by adopting the vertical
averaging ROC (i.e. according to the FPR axis) algorithm
presented in [18]. Statistical conﬁdence will be given by the
t-student test at the 95% conﬁdence level [19].
3. Results
All experiments were conducted in the R environment,
an open source and high-level programming language for
data analysis [20]. In particular, the NB algorithm described
in Section 2.2 is implemented by the naiveBayes function
of the e1071 R package, while the text preprocessing uses
several functions from the tm package [21].
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During the all experiments, we set K = 100 (a reasonable
value also adopted in [13], [15]). For the SNB, we used
a similar number for the hierarchical training set size, i.e.
M = 100. This small value has the advantage of reducing
memory requirements (the user only needs 100 messages in
his mailbox) and some initial experiments with larger values
of M revealed no gain in performance. All TPR@FPR
values will be computed with r = 0.01 (1%).
3.1. Fixed symbiotic group
Two distinct scenarios will be tested, according to the time
periods I and II of Figure 1. Given the S-ENRON corpus
characteristics, in this work we will explore a small number
of ﬁxed symbiotic users: L = 5 for I and L = 3 for II.
The incremental retraining method (Section 2.4) was
applied to both scenarios, by considering all messages within
the corresponding time period. Thus, the number of kam,
far and bec batches (n) will be different for I and II. The
obtained results are summarized as the mean of all test sets
(bi+1, i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}) and shown in Table 2 and Figure
4. The best values are in bold, while underline denotes
a statistical signiﬁcance. In Figure 4, bars denote 95% t-
student conﬁdence intervals and only the most interesting
region of FPR is shown for the ROC curves.
For the ﬁrst scenario (I), the symbiotic strategy outper-
forms the local ﬁlter for all users and metrics, except for
lok and TPR@FPR. A similar behavior occurs for the II
setting, where SNB is better than NB except for kam and
AUC. As false positives have higher costs in spam detection,
the TPR@FPR results are particularly important. Thus, it
is interesting to notice that there is a high TPR@FPR
improvement given by the symbiotic method in several cases
(kam, far and kit for I and bec for II).
To demonstrate the SNB dynamics, Figure 5 shows the
ﬁrst two consecutive graphs of the SNB input importances
under scenario II. Each edge represents the inﬂuence (in %)
of the NB ﬁlter (the origin) in the symbiotic model (the
destination), as measured by applying a sensitivity analysis
procedure [22]. The text in bold (e.g. b2) denotes the last
batch used to train the NB classiﬁer. For example, the ﬁrst
SNB model of user far (left graph) uses a NB ﬁlter from kam
that was trained using 200 messages (Dkam = b1 ∪ b2).
3.2. Incremental symbiotic group
A more realistic scheme is adopted for the time period
III, where users join the symbiotic group in an incremental
fashion, at different time stages according to Figure 1. Thus,
L will grow from 2 to 5. The results are presented in Table
3. As expected, the symbiotic strategy (SNB) clearly favors
newcomers, which have small mailboxes and thus beneﬁt
from the collaboration. In effect, the TPR@FPR differences
are quite large, such as in bec and lok for L = 4 and L = 5
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Figure 4. ROC curves for scenarios I and II.
and kit for L = 5. For demonstration purposes, the ROC
curves are plot for bec, when L = 3 and L = 5 (Figure
6). However, the results show that even “veteran” users gain
from the symbiotic relation when the number of users grow.
For instance, the kam and far TPR@FPR results for L = 5
are 13.7 and 8.5 pp better.
3.3. Contamination attacks
SDM should be more robust to contamination, since it
aggregates responses from several (possible unknown) users
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Table 2. Summary of the results for I and II
I II
AUC TPR@FPR AUC TPR@FPR
user n NB SNB NB SNB n NB SNB NB SNB
kam 16 62.1 95.6 1.5 75.3 70 94.7 94.3 60.7 75.4
far 13 93.5 95.1 19.9 60.7 60 89.4 91.7 59.7 69.1
bec 9 91.5 94.0 54.2 66.6 48 83.5 93.4 25.5 74.8
lok 9 91.4 95.2 78.0 76.3 - - - - -
kit 15 74.6 95.3 18.9 72.8 - - - - -
Table 3. Summary of the results for III
L=2 L=3 L=4 L=5
AUC TPR@FPR AUC TPR@FPR AUC TPR@FPR AUC TPR@FPR
user NB SNB NB SNB NB SNB NB SNB NB SNB NB SNB NB SNB NB SNB
kam 94.4 88.8 40.6 51.8 91.5 87.4 53.3 60.8 95.4 96.8 79.5 79.7 98.4 98.0 67.5 81.2
far 89.9 82.1 60.7 56.1 86.6 87.0 50.7 59.9 88.7 94.7 58.3 74.6 89.6 95.5 65.5 74.0
bec - - - - 80.4 87.6 58.4 66.8 84.5 96.9 15.3 80.5 85.2 97.4 3.6 73.3
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Figure 5. Examples of SNB input importances for II.
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Figure 6. ROC curves for user bec and L=3 (left) and
L=5 (right).
and targeting a speciﬁc victim may be easy but contaminat-
ing the whole symbiotic group is not. We will repeat the
experiments of Section 3.1, by considering only scenario I
and user bec to test the effects of mailbox contamination.
The dictionary assault is simulated by replacing the ﬁrst
10 spam emails at batch 4 from bec by the GNU as-
pell (http://aspell.net/) English dictionary (version 6.0, with
138599 tokens). In Figure 7, gray lines denote the behavior
of NB and SNB without the attack (i.e. results of Section
3.1), black lines show the performance under the attack
and the dot-dashed vertical line shows when the attack
starts6. Local CBF is highly affected. Only 10 messages were
replaced and yet the ﬁlter detection capability is reduced to
a random classiﬁer (since AUC=0.5) through all remaining
batches. In contrast, the symbiotic method is only initially
affected, since as time goes by the performance gets closer to
the no attack scenario. Also, the remaining symbiotic users
maintain their spam detection capabilities, as shown by the
kit results, which is a representative example. This behavior
is explained by the SNB algorithm, which simply discards
a given ﬁlter if it does not help to predict the recent past
M messages of the user. Hence, this experiment shows that
SDM is robust also to saboteurs, i.e. if a particular user
intentionally feeds the group with a random or bad ﬁlter
then this ﬁlter will be simply ignored.
The dictionary attack can be solved by performing a roll-
back (i.e. returning to the previous ﬁlter) or using the RONI
defense [10], which rejects training examples that have a
large negative impact in spam detection. However, focused
assaults are much more difﬁcult to prevent and ﬁnding an
adequate defense is still an open problem [10]. We believe
SDM is an interesting solution due to the same rationale
presented for the dictionary aggression, i.e. the combination
of multiple ﬁlters should overcome the limitations of a single
model contamination.
6. For the bec user, the ﬁlters are not trained with contaminated messages
at batch 4, yet these messages appear in the test set and thus the NB and
SNB performances suffer a moderate decay. The true effect of the attack
is only visible at batch 5.
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Figure 7. The dictionary attack effect.
A new set of experiments was devised, using again
scenario I and bec mailbox. During a given run, a legitimate
message was randomly selected, from batches 6 to 9, as the
target text. We assume that the attacker is conﬁdent about the
target content and thus can guess 50% of the target words. At
batch 4, 10 spam emails were replaced by the contaminated
messages. We repeated this procedure during 20 runs. The
effect of this attack on spam is minimal and thus we will
only show the effect on the target ham e-mails. Figure 8 plots
the ﬁlter spam probability (y-axis) for each target message
(total of 20 runs, x-axis). Since all target messages are ham,
a robust ﬁlter should present low spam probabilities, near the
zero horizontal axis. The results show that local ﬁlter (NB)
is much more vulnerable than the symbiotic strategy (SNB).
The spam probability mean values of NB and SNB are 0.69
and 0.32 (the differences are statistically signiﬁcant). For
example, when using a decision threshold of D = 0.5, 14
(of 20) messages are classiﬁed by NB as spam, while this
number lowers to 6 for SNB. Even if D is raised to 0.999,
NB predicts 13 spam e-mails and SNB only detects 5.
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Figure 8. The focused attack effect.
4. Conclusions
We proposed a novel distributed data mining approach,
called Symbiotic Data Mining (SDM), that uniﬁes Content-
Based Filtering (CBF) with Collaborative Filtering (CF). The
goal is to reuse local ﬁlters from distinct entities in order
to improve personalized ﬁltering while maintaining privacy.
As a case study, we apply the SDM strategy to spam e-
mail detection. Several experiments were carried out under
the new S-Enron corpus, which uses a realistic mixture of
legitimate messages from ﬁve Enron employees with recent
spam based in spam traps. We compared the performance
of SDM and CBF using symbiotic groups with ﬁxed and
incremental number of users. Also, we simulated the effect
of contamination attacks. Our results show that for a small
number of users (i.e. 3 to 5), SDM outperforms personalized
text classiﬁers. Furthermore, SDM is more robust to both
dictionary and focused attacks. Within our knowledge, this
is the ﬁrst time a solution is proposed for the latter type of
contamination.
Spammers and anti-spammers are in an arms race. As
argued by [8], tuning a single classiﬁer to perfection will
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encourage spammers to eventually defeat it. By dynamically
combining ﬁlters from distinct users, we believe that a
stronger protection is achieved. In effect, SDM puts em-
phasis on accessing (indirectly) more data rather than using
more complex local ﬁlters. As future work, we intend to
study scalability issues. Under a large group, this could
be achieved by adopting user selection algorithms (e.g.
clustering user proﬁles). We believe SDM is also potentially
useful in other personalized ﬁltering scenarios, such as
spam over instant messaging (spim) detection and Web page
blocking (e.g. offensive content).
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